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Voluntary Export Restraints and Resource
Allocation in Exporting Countries
Jaime de Melo and L. Alan Winters
This article analyzes the resource implications of voluntary export restraints (vERS)
for exporting countries. A simple analytical method is used to demonstrate that, by
reducing the marginal revenue of its factors of production, a VER causes an industry
in the exporting country to contract, and that the efficiency losses from a VER depend
on the ease with which sales can be diverted from the restricted toward the unrestricted
markets. The method is applied to test the effects of the U.S. Orderly Marketing
Agreement (oMA) for producers of leather footwear in the Republic of Korea during
the period 1977-81. We estimate that the marginal revenue product of factors
employed in leather footwear declined by as much as 9 percent because of the OMA,
an estimate that is corroborated by inspection of time series on output, employment,
and wages of the Korean footwear sector. This implies that there was pressure on the
Korean footwear industry to contract as a result of the OMA.
Most previous investigators of the effects of voluntary export restraints have
been concerned with the welfare costs of such restraints to consumers in im-
porting countries. Examples of previous studies include: estimates of quality
adjusted welfare costs of VERS on automobiles (Feenstra 1984; Dinopoulos and
Kreinin 1988); the claim that, for commodities with little product differentia-
tion and low start-up costs (for example, footwear and textiles), VERS are
ineffective (Baldwin 1982; Bhagwati 1986); and simulations which show that
terms of trade effects are likely to reduce substantially the costs of (gains from)
VERS to importing (exporting) countries (Tarr 1987; Trela and Whalley 1988).
None of these studies-even those which look into the implications of VERS for
exporters-contain investigations into the effects of VERS on resource allocation
in exporting countries. This article fills the gap.
For the sake of simplicity, we analyze the effects of a VER in two steps. First,
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iWe %consilder a very-short-run equilibrium in which the size of the exporting
industry is fixed. Second, we consider the pressures at this equilibrium for the
industry to contract. When the size of the exporting industry is fixed, firms
respond to the VER by reallocating sales away from the restricted to some other
(unrestricted) export market. Such diversions of exports are assumed to have
increasing opportunity costs, which implies that the commodities exported to
the two markets are not perfect substitutes in production-perhaps because
they have different characteristics. Two effects of a VER are distinguished. First,
the sales revenues of the exporting firms may rise or fall depending on the
elasticities of demand in the restricted and unrestricted markets. Second, there
is a misallocation of resources. The VER moves the composition of the export
industry's output to a point on the production possibilities curve where its slope
is no longer equal to the ratio of the two export prices; this constitutes alloca-
tive inefficiency.
In the second step of our analysis, the industry is allowed to shrink in
response to the VER. The VER reduces the marginal revenue products of the
exporting industry's factors of production, and the industry will contract by an
amount dependent on the elasticities of factor supply.
We proceed as follows. The impact of a VER on resource allocation in
exporting countries is analyzed in section 1. In section II, we present an estimate
of the effect of the U.S. Orderly Marketing Agreement (OMA) for nonrubber
footwear imports on the Korean leather footwear industry during the period
1977 to 1981. A model is developed to estimate econometrically the slope of
the production possibilities curve for the footwear industry. This helps to
determine the new point reached on the production possibilities curve as a
consequence of the OMA. The difference between the slope of the curve at the
new point and the new price ratio is used to estimate the fall in the marginal
revenue product for factors employed in the footwear industry. We find that
the marginal revenue product may have fallen by as much as 9 percent because
of the OMA. (The econometric techniques used in section II are described more
fully in appendix A.) In section III we present the results of a simulation
exercise. Combining our econometric estimates with alternative assumptions
about output demand and factor supply elasticities gives illustrative estimates
of the likely welfare effects of the OMA. (The model used to derive the welfare
effects is described in appendix B.) Some concluding remarks are made in
section IV.
I. REAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION IMPLICATIONS OF A VER
In this section, we present an analysis of the sales revenue effects and the
resource allocation implications for an exporting country entering a VER. We
demonstrate under fairly representative conditions that a VER will reduce the
marginal revenue product of factor inputs in the affected industry, and hence
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reduce the size of the industry. To simplify the exposition, we assume that all
output is produced by firms which are identical and perfectly competitive in all
product and factor markets. The output is sold in one of two foreign markets.
A VER restricts exports to one of these markets while those to the second
market remain unrestricted. In addition, while we assume that individual ex-
porting firms are price takers in each export market, the industry as a whole
faces downward-sloping demand curves in each market.
The effects of a VER are presented in two steps. Initially it is assumed that
industry size is fixed and that there are costs to diverting sales from the re-
stricted toward the unrestricted market. With this assumption, it is a simple
matter to analyze the revenue and distortionary implications of the VER. In the
second step, we show that a VER will reduce the marginal revenue product of
factors employed in the industry, which is likely to lead the industry to con-
tract.
This two-step discussion of the effects of a VER is expositionally convenient
and corresponds to the two-stage assumption about firm decisions adopted in
the econometric work of section II. We show in appendix B that the independ-
ence of (weak separability between) input decisions and sales decisions is not
fundamental for the results that are established here.
The assumption that there are increasing marginal costs to the diversion of
sales from the restricted toward the unrestricted market may be interpreted as
indicating the short-run effects of a VER in an industry characterized by product
differentiation. In the short run, where the quantities of factors employed in
the industry are fixed, a shift in production between outputs which use factors
in different proportions will result in increasing marginal costs. Moreover, if
one of the outputs has a specific factor which is in relatively inelastic supply-
for example, a particular labor skill-the mere fact that the outputs are differ-
entiated is sufficient to produce an increasing marginal rate of transformation
between the two products.
The above assumptions allow us to represent our model diagramatically. In
figure 1, foreign export demands in the restricted (A) and unrestricted (B)
markets are represented in quadrants I and II, respectively, while quadrant III
depicts the substitution possibilities facing the industry as it reallocates produc-
tion between sales for market A and those for market B. It is obtained by the
aggregation of the substitution possibilities facing each exporter. The bowed-
out shape of the export transformation curve G(XA, XB) = X reflects the as-
sumption of increasing costs of production associated with changing the prod-
uct mix. Assuming fixed aggregate footwear production X, successive incre-
ments in sales to market B impose increasing resource costs in terms of larger
and larger decreases in export sales to market A. Quadrant IV is bisected by
the 450 line which translates export sales to A from quadrant III to quadrant I.
The unrestricted allocation, A*, is represented by the price-quantity pairs
(PA, XA) and (P*, XB), where superscript asterisks are used to denote the
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unrestricted equilibrium. The slope of the export transformation curve is given
by
dXA GB<
MTA B dXB GA
where Gi = aG/OX, > 0; i = A, B, indicate positive opportunity costs; and
the bowed-out transformation curve reflects the fact that opportunity costs
increase with output.'
The equilibrium for a competitive industry requires that
( 1 ) GA PA
and Pi = 0*Gi where 0* is the marginal cost of producing a unit of X:.In figure
1, the equilibrium condition (equation 1) is represented by the tangency of the
export transformation curve and the price line, Pf, at the unrestricted equilib-
rium, A*.
Now impose a VER which restricts exports to A to the level XA. The restricted
allocation is represented by the new price-quantity pairs (PA, XA) and (PB, 3XB)
where superscript bars indicate the restricted equilibrium. We decompose the
effects of the VER into two parts: a revenue effect, which reflects the way the
VER affects the industry's revenue from exporting, and an allocative distortion,
which arises as the economy is obliged to produce a non-optimal mix of
outputs.
Consider the revenue effect. We have assumed that the industry as a whole
comprises a large number of atomistic firms and therefore cannot behave like a
discriminating monopolist. The presence of unappropriated monopoly rents
means that it is possible that the VER will raise industry revenues. Let EA and e"
denote the elasticity of demand in the restricted and unrestricted markets,
respectively, and assume CA, EB = 0. A departure from the free trade equilibrium
will raise revenues if marginal sales revenue is higher in B (unrestricted) than in
A (restricted), that is, if P,(1 - 1 /EB) > PA(1 - i/EA). Thus if the elasticity of
demand is much greater in the unrestricted than in the restricted market, a VER
may push sales allocation toward that which would be selected by a discrimi-
nating monopolist.2
In the case described above, the VER has the same type of effect as an
optimum export tax. That exporting governments do not preempt the imposi-
tion of an OMA by imposing export taxes of their own volition probably reflects
their uncertainty about the long-run elasticities of demand they face, a fear of
1. Increasing marginal costs requires GAA, GBB > 0 and GAAGBB - GABŽ 0.
2. While we do not wish to stress the empirical relevance of this possibility, it has been pointed out
in previous theoretical discussions of the effects of VERS in non-competitive markets. It is interesting to
speculate that the two-tier quota allocation system used in Korea (and elsewhere) implies that greater
sales toward non-restricted markets may have the objective of revenue maximization. For further
analysis see Bark and de Melo (1988).
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retaliation from importing governments, and a fear of reprimand from inter-
national organizations. Of course, once importing governments have estab-
lished OMAS, exporting governments are likely to try to exploit their potential
market power through alternative quota allocation schemes. Note that if the
exporting industry had initially acted as a discriminating monopolist or faced
optimum export taxes, it would already have been maximizing its profits, and
hence could only have suffered from the imposition of a VER.
Consider next the allocative distortions caused by the VER. Because we have
assumed at this stage that firms maximize revenue for a given level of X, which
is equivalent to maximizing profits, the new allocation must lie on the same
export transformation curve as the old, and given the exogenous value of XA,
the chosen point will be R. At this new equilibrium, the equality of relative
prices to the marginal rate of transformation no longer holds. The relative price
of A has been forced up by the constraint on sales so that it is tangent to the
tranformation curve at A, but the marginal rate of transformation (MRTAB)
has fallen to R as the relative output of A has fallen (see figure 1). Hence
GA GA
> pA, whereas - < -
PB PB* GB G B
This violation entails a well-understood distortion cost, which is independent
of whether total sales revenues have increased after the imposition of the VER.
For producers to choose point R voluntarily, they would have to face the
relative price line (PAX'1B), which equals the marginal rate of transformation at
R. PAv is known as the virtual price and, as is clear from figure 1, it implies a
relative price less than both the unconstrained price (PA/PB) and the actual
price (PA/PB)
We now turn to the second step of the discussion and show that the VER will
create an incentive for the industry to contract. With production and allocation
decisions separable, input mixes (which depend on factor prices) are indepen-
dent of output mixes (which depend on output prices); hence, given fixed
relative factor prices, we can construct a composite factor, Z, with wage W.
This allows us to characterize production in terms of the aggregate output
index as X = X(Z) and, assuming constant returns to scale, we can select units
such that X Z. Hence we can assess the effects of a VER on the size of the
industry as measured by aggregate input Z.
In an unrestricted equilibrium, sales are allocated between markets in such a
way that the marginal revenue product of a factor devoted to producing goods
for market A equals that of the factor if it were used to produce for market B.
We may write the condition for an unconstrained equilibrium as follows:
dRA dRB dR(2)= =W
dZ dZ dZ
where RA is the revenue derived in market A, and so forth, W is the cost of
factor Z and, in our earlier notation,
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dR, p P X=
dZ G *i
To assess the effects of the VER on the size of the industry, we need to
consider whether the marginal revenue product of Z is increased or decreased
by the VER. This can be done entirely in terms of market B. Under free trade,
the marginal revenue products are equal across markets, whereas under the
binding VER, only market B can accommodate marginal sales. The marginal
revenue product in B falls as more and more sales are switched to B, but while
the VER is binding, the marginal revenue product in A is zero. Hence marginal
product for a given Z falls. Constrained revenue maximization by the represen-
tative firm implies that in the new equilibrium:
dRB PB
(3) ~~~~~~dZ GB
Since the VER redirects sales from market A to market B, it drives up the costs
of producing for market B (it reduces the marginal product of Z), because GBB
> 0. Thus, even if demand for B is perfectly elastic-that is, PB = PB-the
value of the marginal product of Z is reduced by the VER. If demand is less
than perfectly elastic, that is, PB < PB the effect is exacerbated by the drop in
price. Hence independent of whether the VER increases or decreases industry
revenue, it always reduces the marginal revenue product schedule of its factor
inputs. Unless factor supply is entirely inelastic, a falling MRP schedule will
cause the industry to reduce both its output and input levels.
The new long-term equilibrium could be represented in figure 1. The trans-
formation curve shrinks inward and is tangential to a price ratio with slope
between (P/IPB) and (P'/'PB) at a point with output (XA, X'A) where X'B >
XB. Point N represents one possibility.
A more direct approach to analyzing the long run is directly in terms of the
market for the composite factor. Figure 2 illustrates three cases of interest. The
VER causes the marginal revenue product curve to fall, say from MRP' to MRP2.
In the very short run, in which factor inputs cannot be changed, the input level
remains at Zx, but there is a loss of factor rents and therefore welfare to factor
owners equal to area AEFC. Thus there are no output losses but large distor-
tion and resource costs. This, of course, is the implication derived by consid-
ering the allocation part of the model alone. In the opposite case, if the foot-
wear industry (in addition to each of its individual firms) faces an infinitely
elastic supply of Z, then the new input level is given by Z; there are large
output losses, but no distortionary resource costs because factors shift to other
industries in which they are equally productive. Under these circumstances,
0 = 0*, and the shift in the marginal revenue product curve is accommodated
by output contraction alone. In another case, the industry faces an upward-
sloping supply curve for factors, the final input level is Z, which entails a
smaller contraction but imposes welfare losses equal to the area AEDB. Now
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Figure 2. Three Cases for the Market for the Composite Factor Z
Where the VER Causes the MRP Curve to Shift Down
Input price, W
W= W(Z)
A W = W
B ----- -- MRP
C F
Z Z Z Aggregate input, Z
Note: Z*is the short-run case where Z is fixed at Z'. Z is the case where there is an
infinitely elastic supply of Z. Z is the case where there is an upward-sloping supply curve
for factors.
0 < 0*, and there is an efficiency loss, but it is smaller than that implied in the
very short run in which industry factor use is fixed.
In a more complete exposition of the implications of a VER, the number of
affected markets would be increased and the two-step approach relaxed. The
empirical analysis in section II addresses the more general case in which sales
are allocated to one restricted and two unrestricted markets, and we discuss
below how the analysis would be modified to increase the number of unres-
tricted markets. As for the two-step approach, de Melo and Winters (1990)
show for the general case of a two-output, one-input technology that spillover
to unrestricted markets and output contraction will occur unless there is a very
strong positive relation between output destined for one market and the costs
of producing for others. (Their findings are also discussed briefly in appendix
B.) Because marginal production costs for each market are likely to show only
small interdependencies, it is unlikely that the qualitative predictions of the
above analysis would differ in a more general setup.
Because we have only two markets, we have been able to establish the
contractionary effect of a VER by considering the marginal revenue product in
each market directly. With more markets, as in the empirical application be-
low, it is more convenient to use an alternative approach, derived from Neary
and Roberts (1980). These authors show that a constrained equilibrium can be
expressed as an unconstrained equilibrium at a different set of prices. These
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are the virtual prices, mentioned earlier, which are simply the set of prices at
which, given the overall level of activity, actual quantities supplied in the
constrained equilibrium would be supplied voluntarily. For unconstrained mar-
kets, virtual prices are equal to actual prices. Referring back to figure 1, the
quantities given by R would be voluntarily supplied at the set of prices
(PA', PB), whereas actual prices in the constrained case are represented by
(PA, PB).
For any unconstrained equilibrium, the value of the marginal product arising
from an extra unit of aggregate input Z, optimally allocated, is a positive
function of the set of prices (P1, . . ., Pj); where n - 1 is the number of
unrestricted markets. For a constrained equilibrium, the Neary-Roberts results
allow us to calculate the value of the marginal product schedule by evaluating
the same function at virtual prices (PV). The effect of a binding VER in market
A is to reduce PA below its actual price. Because, in unconstrained markets,
actual and virtual prices are equal, the reduction in PA means that at least some
prices fall and none rise and that therefore the value of the marginal product
falls. Although it is not possible, without knowledge of the factor supply curve,
to determine equilibrium values for prices and output, this approach suggests
that the VER puts downward pressure on output. This is the procedure used in
section II to measure the shift in the marginal revenue product schedule; the
equivalent of distance EF in figure 2.
II. ESTIMATING THE REDUCTION IN FACTOR DEMAND: KOREAN LEATHER
FOOTWEAR
In this section, we present estimates of the effect of the United States's
Orderly Marketing Agreement (OMA) on nonrubber footwear on the demand
for the factors employed in Korean leather footwear production. We use the
simple model described in the previous section: it is assumed that the Korean
footwear industry produces an aggregate quantity of footwear using a single
composite factor of production, and subsequently allocates this aggregate
amount to one of three markets according to a constant elasticity of transfor-
mation (CET) allocation function. This simple function allows us to analyze,
albeit indirectly, the efficiency implications of the OMA without access to spe-
cific data on the allocation of factor inputs to sales in each market. The crucial
parameter in our model is the elasticity of transformation, which is a measure
of the extent to which production may be shifted between outputs destined for
different markets.
In terms of figure 1, it measures responsiveness to changes in the output mix
along a given export transformation curve. With this parameter value, it is
possible to predict the actual output mix in the omi period, and the difference
between actual and virtual prices during the period. From the latter we can
calculate the extent of the shift in the marginal revenue product schedule for
the composite factor.
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Using quarterly data for the period from the first quarter of 1975 (I) through
the fourth quarter of 1986 (IV), we estimate the elasticity of transformation
between supplies of leather footwear destined for three markets-the United
States, the unconstrained European Community, (which comprises France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands), and the rest of the
world. The United States imposed the OMA on Korean exports of nonrubber
footwear between the third quarter of 1977 and the second quarter of 1981,
inclusive (although the evidence suggests that the restrictions on Korea ceased
to be binding by mid-1980; Aw and Roberts 1986). Hence, the observations
corresponding to this period are not included in the estimation period. The
unconstrained European Community group, according to Hamilton (1989),
imposed no quantitative restrictions on Korean footwear exports over our
sample period. Some of the countries in the rest of the world did have import
restrictions on footwear, but they may reasonably be treated as unconstrained
overall.
Following the model described in section 1, individual Korean exporters are
assumed to be price takers. They seek to maximize revenues subject to a CET
transformation function, which relates the quantities of each type of export
footwear to an overall index of output (input); that is,
max X piX, subject o [ i a X' =X
Xi i i~
where Xi is exports to market i at price pi, X is the index of aggregate output,
and y > 1.
Writing p = 1 / (-y - 1) for the elasticity of transformation, standard manip-
ulation allows us to express the share of market i in total exports as (see
Hickman and Lau 1973):
(4) si = ai(pi/p)P; i = 1, 2, 3
where si is the share of i in the volume of exports, si = Xi/E Xj,
J
1/p
is a fixed-weight price index, and ai = ai-P.
Although firms are price takers, the exporting industry is not, so the aggre-
gate Korean export price is potentially endogenous to our model. Both this fact
and the possibility of there being errors in variables suggest the need for more
robust methods of estimation than are possible for nonlinear systems of equa-
tions with complex error structures. We decided, therefore, to linearize the
model about a base period (see Hickman and Lau 1973). If we set prices to
unity in the base period (second quarter of 1984), introduce a time-trend with
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value zero in the base period, and add seasonal factors and a lagged dependent
variable, we obtain
(5) Yit= p a, (Pi, - PI) + Nit + Y bikDk + X 1yit-i + u± ,
k
where yi, -sia-a' is the deviation of i's share from its base value, ae%, pt
I cxj Pj, is a base-weighted price index, t is a time trend incremented by one per
quarter, E bikDk are seasonal effects for quarter k, k = 1, 3, 4 where the
dummy for the second quarter has been suppressed because the base period is
a second quarter, X1 represents dynamic effects on the share of market i of its
own lagged values, and u2t are stochastic errors.
Because yi, sums to zero over i in each time period, equation 5 for one of the
three markets must be dropped in estimation. We dropped the equation for the
unconstrained European Community. We then estimated the remaining equa-
tions by a procedure described in appendix A.
The final equation is given in table 1. The estimated elasticity of transfor-
mation is perhaps a little low, given the anecdotal evidence that exists on the
degree of competition and product substitution-homogeneity in world footwear
markets; but it is a fairly robust result. Moreover, two other pieces of evidence
suggest that Korean exports to different markets are imperfect substitutes. First,
the unit values of Korean exports to different markets differ by up to 50
Table 1. The Allocation Function for Korean Leather Footwear Exports
Variable Estimated coefficient Standard error
p 1.311 0.756
'YR -0.0013 0.0009
'Y u 0.0024 0.0010
3R1 0.074 0.022
'8UI -0.076 0.021
3R3 0.060 0.019
803 -0.063 0.018
6R4 0.058 0.019
8U4 -0.060 0.020
X, 0.401 0.102
r 0.137
R2
Rest of the world 0.80
United States 0.88
Unconstrained European
Community 0.75
Long-run elasticity of
transformations 2.19
Note: The subscript R refers to the rest of the world and the U to the United States; r is a first-stage
estimate of the autocorrelation parameter.
a. Calculated as pl(1 - X,).
Source: de Melo and Winters (1989, appendix).
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Table 2. Estimated Effects of the OMA on Korean Leather Footwear Exports
to the United States, 1977-80
Proportionate
Actual minus difference between Change
predicted actual and virtual in aggregate
share price price index
Year and quarter (1) (2) (3)
1977,3 -0.176 -0.121 -0.095
1977,4 -0.024 -0.017 -0.013
1978,1 -0.076 -0.050 -0.039
1978,2 -0.159 -0.103 -0.081
1978,3 -0.098 -0.056 -0.044
1978,4 -0.093 -0.051 -0.040
1979,1 -0.208 -0.096 -0.076
1979,2 -0.188 -0.081 -0.063
1979,3 -0.284 -0.110 -0.087
1979,4 -0.159 -0.065 -0.051
1980,1 -0.052 -0.023 -0.018
1980,2 -0.092 -0.040 -0.031
Source: table 1 and authors' calculations.
percent, which suggests that there may indeed be genuine product heterogene-
ity. Second, the estimates in table 1 display dramatically different seasonal
patterns-with the allocation of shares between the United States and the rest
of the world switching by over 10 percentage points with the season.
Table 2 explores the effects of the OMA on Korean exports to the United
States more closely. On the basis of our estimates, we can predict the share of
exports to the United States in the OMA period if quantities had been uncon-
strained at the actual price. Column 1 reports the difference between the actual
and predicted shares during the OMA period. It is consistently negative, which
suggests that the OMA was binding, although it shows signs of weakening during
1980. Column 2 approximates the proportionate difference between the virtual
and actual prices of exports to the United States. Because the actual U.S. share
falls short of that predicted by the export allocation model, the virtual price
for the United States is below the actual price by as much as 12 percent (in
third quarter of 1977). Thus the OMA may be seen to have had an effect
equivalent to reducing the price of exports to the United States by 5-12 percent
below actual levels with no compensating price rises in other markets. This
makes it clear that the OMA put pressure on the Korean footwear industry to
contract.
The extent of the contractionary pressure can be calculated as the difference
in the aggregate price index evaluated at actual and virtual prices. This calcu-
lation, reported in column 3 of table 2, is a linear approximation to the change
in the marginal return to the aggregate factor in the leather footwear sector. It
shows that the marginal revenue product of the factors of production in the
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Figure 3. Index of Employment and Output in Footwear Relative to All
Manufacturing (1980 = 1)
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leather footwear industry declined by as much as 9 percent because of the
OMA. 3
The econometric estimates strongly suggest that the Korean footwear indus-
try would have contracted during the period of the OMA. This prediction is
supported by time series data on output, employment, and wages of the Korean
footwear sector. These data are illustrated in figure 3, which reports footwear
output and employment relative to the corresponding series for the entire
manufacturing sector: although Korean industry generally contracted over this
period (see appendix table A-i), the footwear sector suffered more than aver-
age. Output and employment in the footwear industry peaked in 1978, one
year after the signing of the OMA agreement. This peak is later than predicted
by our model, but it is not out of line with the detailed account of the OMA
given by Yoffie (1983). He remarks that Korean producers went to considerable
lengths to negotiate the OMA in a fashion that allowed extended periods of
adjustment. Thus it is quite conceivable that output and employment remained
high into 1978.
3. Comparisons with free trade rather than actual prices would reduce these estimates somewhat. In
the absence of an estimated elasticity of demand, however, the former are not calculable, but the higher
the elasticity of demand the smaller the difference. In our simulation results below, we use free trade
prices.
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One of the causes of the Korean slump was rising real wages over the period
1977-79, which might have harmed labor-intensive industries such as foot-
wear. In fact, wages in footwear fell during 1978 relative to those in other
labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, apparel, and leather products. Thus
although it cannot be entirely ruled out that the time series on footwear reflect
only economywide phenomena, there is some evidence of particular hardship
in the footwear sector. Certainly we find nothing to refute our prediction that
the OMA caused a contraction of Korea's footwear sector.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE WELFARE CALCULATIONS
The results above confirm our hypothesis that a VER leads to output contrac-
tion and has adverse effects on efficiency if the factors employed in the industry
are not available to it in perfectly elastic supply. However, as discussed in
section I, a VER also results in revenue effects which may either reinforce or
counteract the efficiency costs. (It was demonstrated in section I that the latter,
in the long run, lead the industry to contract and to reduce factor incomes.)
The combined long-run effect is captured in the calculation of the welfare
effect, which is estimated by simulation techniques in this section. Welfare
effects are calculated by adding the gains in or losses of profits to firms and the
loss of income to factors.
The simulation model is used to provide rough orders of magnitude of the
potential welfare effects of a VER, using the U.S. OMA on Korean exports of
leather footwear as a reference case. The calibrated simulations are based
generally on the model presented in section 1, with constant foreign price
elasticities of demand; a CET function describing sales allocation; and a con-
stant elasticity of factor supply. (Further details are given in appendix B.)
For the reference-case calculations, we use our estimate of the elasticity of
transformation from section 11 to measure the ease with which exporters may
divert sales from restricted to unrestricted markets and complement it with
rough estimates of factor supply elasticities and price elasticities of export
demand. Our estimates of the price elasticity of export demand are consistent
with the range of 0.5-1.0 reported by Pearson (1983, p. 78) and Goldstein and
Khan (1985).
Welfare is measured by the sum of profits and factor incomes, and the change
in welfare is expressed as a proportion of variable factor (Z) income before the
VER. The change in factor demand from the restricted industry affects the wages
throughout the markets in which the factors are traded and the contraction of
the restricted industry drives down factor rewards both for itself and for any
other industry using the same factors. Hence a given wage reduction has a
larger impact on welfare, the larger the stock of factors affected. This effect is
represented crudely in the welfare calculations by L, the size of the total factor
stock affected relative to the initial size of the affected industry, Z. A value of
L = 1 implies that initially only the VER-affected industry employs the factor
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concerned; a value of 5 implies that the VER industry originally employed 20
percent of the relevant factor stock. Because L will vary depending on the
industry under consideration, we give calculations for cases where the market
for the variable factor Z is 1, 5, or 10 times the initial allocation to the industry
under the VER.
Illustrative calculations for a range of elasticities are given in table 3. For all
calculations, it is assumed that there is a 10 percent reduction in the volume of
sales to the restricted market, where the initial share of exports to the restricted
market is 42 percent of total exports (a figure corresponding to the leather
footwear case). Before examining the results for the different elasticities shown
as the five cases of the table, in which several elasticities are varied simultane-
ously, we describe briefly the effects of varying elasticities one by one and
compare the results with those in case 1, where all elasticities are unity.
In the case of unitary export demand elasticities, there are no sales revenue
effects, so it is easy to isolate the effects of varying supply elasticities. The more
difficult it is to reallocate the existing volume of production, the higher the
Table 3. Illustrative Welfare Calculations
Case
Item 1 2 3 4 5
Value of elasticity
Type of elasticity
Price elasticity of restricted demand, cA 1.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 2.0
Price elasticity of unrestricted demand, eB 1.0 0.6 1.0 2.0 4.0
Elasticity of transformation, p 1.0 0.5 1.5 1.5 3.0
Elasticity of factor supply, e- 1.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 3.0
Result of simulation
Variable
Outputb -5.0 -3.9 -4.3 -4.5 -4.1
Sales revenueb 0.0 11.6 4.6 0.0 -2.1
Factor wageb -4.0 -7.7 -2.2 -2.3 -1.4
Welfarec
1 6.2 19.7 10.2 5.5 2.7
5 -0.5 6.9 6.5 1.7 0.4
10 -8.9 -9.1 1.9 -3.0 -2.5
Note: Notation is given in appendix B, equation, B-2. Unrestricted equilibrium: XA = 100; XB
140; P = 1.00; Z = 100.
a. Size of market for Z in relation to initial allocation of Z in industry subject to VER.
b. Percentage change.
c. Change in income expressed as a share of initial variable factor income (see appendix B, equation
B-13). These changes are shown for three values of the size of the total factor stock affected relative to
the initial size of the affected industry.
Source: table 1 and authors' calculations.
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efficiency cost of a given VER because the adjustment comes from output
contraction rather than from sales reallocation. Likewise, as explained in sec-
tion I, the higher the elasticity of factor supply, the lower the efficiency costs
of a VER. Indeed, a similar variation (around unity) of the elasticity of factor
supply has more of an effect on efficiency than will an equal variation of the
elasticity of transformation.
Cases 2 through 5 give estimates of the welfare effects of a VER for low,
medium, and high sets of elasticities. The results in case 4 may be viewed as
best guess calculations. In the case of a VER, there is a net loss if the market for
Z is large. But if the market for Z is small (relative to the initial allocation of
Z to the industry), there is a net gain from the VER despite the negative
efficiency effects because of their relatively smaller weight in the welfare calcu-
lation. The same is true for the case where all the elasticities are low (case 2).
The larger efficiency costs are offset by the larger revenue gains. It is also
noteworthy that the simulated decreases in the marginal revenue product of Z
(represented by the factor wage row of table 3) are similar in magnitude to the
range reported from the econometric estimates in column 3 of table 2. Finally,
in case 5, with higher demand elasticities, the revenue effect becomes negative,
which implies larger welfare losses. Thus, if demand elasticities are not too low
and supply elasticities are not too high, a VER is likely to lead to a welfare
loss.4
Although the net effects of the VER are fairly small in table 3, the gross effects
are significant. The VER increases profits for those with the right to export to
the restricted markets but harms all other agents. In particular, labor is likely
to lose from industrial-country protection, an ironic result in light of the fact
that protection is often advocated as a means of protecting workers. If so,
protection should be seen as a means of protecting rich industrial country
workers at the expense of workers in poor developing countries.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This article has presented a simple model to analyze the revenue and effi-
ciency effects of a VER at the industry level. Motivated by the evidence that
developing countries often have limited success in switching sales toward unres-
tricted markets, we have analyzed the impact on the exporting industry. In
order to do this, we have separated revenue effects arising from sales realloca-
tion toward unrestricted markets from efficiency effects arising from output
contraction.
The analytical discussion of the effects of a VER was then corroborated with
an application to the U.S. OMA agreement with Korean exporters of leather
4. The elasticity of factor supply (E,) is not independent of the relative size of the industry in the
factor market (L). For example, for an industry like footwear, f5 is likely to be in the range of 2-4 and
L perhaps 10 or more, whereas in textiles, the corresponding pair would be e, in the range of 0.5-2.0
and L around 5.
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footwear. The econometric estimates indicate both a limited ability to switch
sales toward unrestricted markets and a sharp fall in the marginal revenue
product of factors employed in the Korean leather footwear industry during the
period where the OMA was in effect. Combined with extraneous estimates of
export demand and factor supply elasticities, illustrative welfare calculations
suggest that the OMA may well have resulted in a welfare loss to exporting
countries, especially if demand elasticities are relatively elastic and supply re-
sponses relatively inelastic.
APPENDIX A
This appendix presents a detailed description of the econometric model of
export allocation introduced in section II and an account of its estimation. We
assume that exporters are price takers and that they seek to maximize their
revenues subject to a CET transformation function relating the quantities of
each type of footwear export to an overall index of output (input). Their
objective is
(A-1) max E piX1 subject to [atxij = X
Xi i
where Xi is exports to market i, at price pi, X is the index of aggregate output,
and 7> 1.
Standard manipulations (see Armington 1969) produce supply functions for
the individual markets,
(A-2) Xi = ar-P(pi/p*)PX
where p* is the dual CET price index of X given by:
(A-3) * = k a5p(+PJ11+p)
and
P L1- 1]
is the (negative of the) elasticity of transformation between exports for any pair
of markets; p > 0.
Further manipulation (see Hickman and Lau 1973) transforms equation A-2
into the more convenient form:
Xi = c'ip4 ajpj1 x
or
(A-4) Si= ai(pi/p)p + u,
226 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 4, NO. 2
where X _ E X. is a simple aggregation of exports, s, is the share of i in the
volume of exports,
P [E arPt]
is a fixed-weight price index, (xi = a,-", and ui is a stochastic component added
at this stage for estimation purposes.
To facilitate the treatment of simultaneity and errors in variables, equation
A-4 is linearized about a base period. We used the second quarter of 1984 as
the base because it lay well outside the period of possible rationing, and yet
was relatively central to our sample of unrationed observations. Subsequent
tests suggested that the choice of base period affects the results slightly, but not
sufficiently to disturb the qualitative conclusions in the text. If we set prices to
unity in the base period, introduce a time trend with value zero in the base,
and add seasonal factors and dynamics, the linearization gives
(A-5) yi, P <(pit - Pt) + Tit + E bi,kD + X,Yit-, + X4Yit-4 + Uit
where Yit- si - ae' is the deviation of i's share from its base value,
a% p,Pt ao,p. is a base-weighted price index, t is a time trend incremented
by one per quarter, bi(Dk are seasonal effects for quarter k, k = 1, 3, 4 where
k i 
the dummy for quarter two has been suppressed because the base period is a
second quarter, and Xl, X4 represent dynamic effects on the share of market i,
felt through lags of itself.
Adding up requires that z a. = 1 and that L (5k = 0 eY = S uj, = O for all
k and t. The first condition is satisfied automatically; the latter, by dropping
the equation for the unconstrained European Community. Usually with this
procedure, the final estimates are invariant with respect to the equation
dropped, but because of the methods required by the errors in the variables,
that is the use of instrumental variables, this is not so. In practice, however,
the choice made very little difference.
Adding up also requires that, unless the errors are characterized by full vector
autoregression, the dynamic structure implied by the lags X, and X4 must be
common to all commodities. The lag X therefore appears in both equations as
a cross-equation restriction. The use of lagged dependent variables may be
justified on several grounds-for example, partial adjustment of price expecta-
tions, as in Hickman and Lau (1973), or habit formation. For systems of sum-
constrained equations, it represents by far the most convenient approach to
dynamic generalization. The choice of lags 1 and 4 to capture the dynamics
was made a priori on the basis of previous experience with quarterly data sets.
Equation A-5 may be stacked over i and written in matrix form:
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F ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~11
_I _ c4(P 1 -p) t O D O D3 0D4O0Ly, L4y1 _. r ui
(A-6) I 1~2 +
Y2 0120(P2 -P) 0 tO0 D1 0 D, 0 D, Ly, L'y, 621 L 2
614
624
L 4 
where L is the lag operator and all the roman letters denote (n x 1) vectors,
where n is the number of observations.
Ignoring the errors in variables, equation A-6 may be simply estimated allow-
ing for autocorrelation and cross-equation correlations. Following Parks (1967),
we first estimate A-5 for each commodity separately, and calculate a single
first-order autocorrelation coefficient. (The serial correlation adjustment factor
must be common to all equations if the system is to add up). Transforming the
data appropriately, we then reestimate by commodity to calculate E(iiuj),
where the iu are the errors from the transformed equations. Finally, using these
variances and covariances, we transform the data again to estimate equation
A-6 by generalized least squares.
To allow for the simultaneity and the errors in variables, we use instrumental
variable estimation. The technique presumes that the instrumental variables are
correlated with the true values of the variables in equation A-5 but not their
errors of observation. If this is true, our estimates are consistent and asymptot-
ically efficient. Instruments were drawn from both the importing countries
(industrial production, the wholesale price index for manufactures, and the
exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar) in order to reflect demand factors, and from
Korea (the per unit value of manufactured exports, the index of industrial
production, and the dollar exchange rate) to reflect broad supply-side phenom-
ena. Whenever Ly and L' are included in the equation, the instrumental varia-
bles are also included in lagged form. Finally, the genuinely exogenous varia-
bles in A-6-that is, D, and t-are also included in the set of instruments.
The estimation method is based on Aigner and others (1984). We assume
that there exists a true relation equivalent to equation A-6 but without errors
in variables, and which may be written as:
(A-7) y = V + u
where t represents the true value of X and y and u have their usual definitions.
The relation between the true t and the observed X independent data is
(A-8) X + V
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There also exists a set of relations between the k true independent variables
and the I indicator (instrumental) variables (Z).
(A-9) Z = 4r' + A.
The error terms V and A are assumed to be independently normally distributed
with zero means and also to be independent of t. The covariances of the rows
of V and A (v, and a) are given by Q and 0 respectively and the variance of u
by a2 . The true independent variables are assumed to have an expected scaled
cross-product matrix, K = Em-'t't, where m = 2n is the number of rows in
the matrixes y, X, Z, (, V, and A. Following Aigner and others, we can write
the various covariance matrices E= Em'I'7, for I, J = X, y, Z as
(A-lOa) =yy a2 + f3'Kf3
(A-lOb) Exy= K)3
(A-10c) X= rK/3
(A-lOd) ZZ= K + Q
(A-1Oe) 1zx = rK
(A-lOf) EZZ = rKr' + 0
Equations (A-10c) and (A-IOe) yield
Ezy = ZZX
from which, multiplying both sides by EzxEz- and substituting sample values
S 1 for population values E we obtain
(A-11) 13 = (zszx)-'s'xs~Z'S'Y
[X' Z (Z' Z)-')X' Z] (Z' Z)-' Z'y.
B is multivariately normally distributed with asymptotic variance
(A-12) var ( a') = (cr2 + 1' 00) (SzxS' S)-'
which is the minimum variance bound that can be derived by linear methods.
We approximate A-12 below by substituting l8 for , and using A-10 to express
the first bracket in terms of observables.
System A-10 presumes that the errors are independently and identically dis-
tributed, but in our case we need to allow for the presence of autocorrelation
and the fact that E(u1tu2 ,) * 0 where ul and u2 are subvectors of u referring to
the first and second equations. In fact, however, these modifications make
virtually no difference to the estimator. Taking the latter first, partitioning all
variables in A-7 to A-9 conformably with u, and u2, versions of A-10 may be
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derived for all combinations of yi, Xi and Z7, i = 1, 2. If the only change in
assumption is that E(uiuj) = atj, i F4 j, only A-lOa is changed; it becomes
(A-lOa') ZYY, = e, + ,'KO
In all other equations, the partitioned covariances are the same as the unparti-
tioned ones in A-10. This means that the same instrumental estimation method
may be applied to a set of first-stage estimators to derive the a , which are then
used to transform all the observable data into the form assumed in the main
stage just described. Provided that the estimates of a.j are consistent, the asymp-
totic properties of the final estimates are unchanged. A similar approach is
taken to the autocorrelation.
The variance estimate (equation A-12) may be used to conduct statistical
inference on the coefficients. The validity of a set of q linear constraints, Qf,
r, may be explored by means of the test statistic
(Q3 - r)' [Q Var (f)Q' I-' (Q3 - r)
which is distributed x2 under the null hypothesis (see Amemiya 1985). This
test suggested that it was acceptable to set X4 = 0 in the final equation.
(The data were collected and prepared by Taeho Bark and Paul Brenton from
Korean Customs data publications. They are fully described in the appendix of
de Melo and Winters 1989. In terms of the final classifications in table 2 of
that source, leather footwear is defined here as headings 6402.1000-
6402.4900.)
Appendix Table A-1. The Korean Footwear Sector, 1974-83
Footwear as a percentage of total
Footwear manufacturing
Year Employment' Output" Wages' Employment OUtpUtd Wages
1974 6,600 33 303 0.518 85.3 85.3
1975 11,000 53 364 0.788 114.5 77.9
1976 14,200 74 493 0.84 121.3 82.6
1977 19,800 108 657 1.046 147.1 85.1
1978 26,000 159 846 1.249 174.9 79.3
1979 22,000 107 1,136 1.055 105.0 81.1
1980 22,700 100 1,366 1.127 100.0 79.2
1981 26,000 111 1,538 1.293 97.9 74.8
1982 36,500 113 1,809 1.77 94.6 78.4
1983 40,500 122 2,025 1.86 87.8 80.2
a. Person-years.
b. Index: 1980 = 100.
c. In thousands of won per year.
d. Ratio of index numbers: 1980 = 100.
Source: U.N. Industrial Development Organization data.
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APPENDIX B
General Model and Welfare Calculations
General model. Consider the general case of firms in perfect competition in
which the allocation and input decisions are made jointly.5 In this case, weak
separability is not imposed on the allocation and production decisions. Tech-
nology is represented by a one-input, two-output production function. Let
variable factor requirements, Z, allocated to the restricted (XA) and unrestricted
(XB) markets be given by:
(B-1) Z = G(XA, XB)
where Z is the quantity used of the composite factor, Gi is aZiaX, > 0, and G
is homothetic and homogeneous of degree r < 1. Under the assumption of
profit maximization, de Melo and Winters (1990) show that the imposition of
a VER on sales to A(XA < X*), leads to the following expressions for output
(B-2) and for national welfare (B-3).
(B-2) =AH [B GB Ge
[XB eL G ZeG]
(B-3) dXA LLEA EB_ B N] G]
where eA, eB, eN < 0 are respectively the elasticities of demand for A, B, and
the variable factor Z with respect to the wage in other sectors using Z, e2 > 0
is the elasticity of supply of Z. From B-2, it is clear that a VER in A will most
likely lead the industry to contract if one assumes increasing marginal costs,
that is, Gii > 0, and if one recognizes the constraints imposed by the second-
order conditions for profit maximization. Only very strong (and implausible)
interactions between A and B leading to a large positive value for GAB would
lead the industry to expand. Hence, a VER is likely to lead the industry to
contract.
From B-3, the change in national welfare defined as the sum of industry
profits and factor payments is determined by an allocation component which
measures whether switching sales from A to B raises revenue, and a size com-
ponent which measures whether switching factors across sectors is beneficial.
Welfare calculations. The welfare calculations in section III come from a
numerical application of the model presented in section I, with constant elastic-
ity of demand curves (equations B-4 and B-5); a CET function to allocate sales
between the restricted and unrestricted markets A and B (equation B-6); and a
5. This appendix draws on de Melo and Winters (1990).
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constant elasticity of supply function for the factor, Z (equation B-11). An
unrestricted equilibrium is described by the following set of equations:
(B-4) XA = AA PEA CAA > °
(B-5) XB =AB PB eB > 0
(B-6) = AC(oAXA + aBXB) p P = 1/Y-1; eY > 0
(B-7) PA =*A ) AC CA(XA/X)"'
(B-8) PB = AC l B(XB/X)1P
(B-9) X = XS
(B-10) XS = ASZeZ
(B-1l1) Z = Az PEz;,Ez > O
(B-12) Pz = Aso*
where Ai, (i c A, B, C, Z, S) are normalizing constants determined by calibra-
tion, that is, constants calculated so that the set of equations describing the
model is satisfied for the initial levels of prices and quantities. In the free-trade
equilibrium, industry profits, 7r, are zero as sales revenue equals payments to
Z, PzZ 
With the VER, XA is fixed at XA < XA and the first-order condition for the
allocation to the restricted market (B-7) is dropped. As explained in section I,
as a result of the VER, 0 > 0* (unless ez = oo).
The welfare measure is:
(B-13) AW = W, - W* = (Air + APZL)/PZ
where L is a scalar indicating the size of the industry in the market for Z.
The calculations in section III are obtained by solving the model represented
by equations B-4 to B-12 for an unrestricted equilibrium and for a restricted
equilibrium with XA = 0.9 X*. When elasticities are varied, the Ai parameters
are recalibrated so as to start from the same initial unrestricted values for prices
and quantities.
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